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Abstract. Perception is a safety-critical function of autonomous vehi-
cles and machine learning (ML) plays a key role in its implementation.
This position paper identifies (1) perceptual uncertainty as a perfor-
mance measure used to define safety requirements and (2) its influence
factors when using supervised ML. This work is a first step towards a
framework for measuring and controling the effects of these factors and
supplying evidence to support claims about perceptual uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
An Autonomous Driving System (ADS) consists of components for perception
of the environment and vehicle state, planning the vehicle actions, and con-
trolling the vehicle to implement these actions. While ML can play a role in
all three areas, in the position paper we focus attention on perception and the
use of supervised ML to infer the state information. Furthermore, we take an
uncertainty-centric view of safety. The level of assurance in the safety of an ADS
could be expressed in terms of our uncertainty that it will behave acceptably
safely in all relevant situations. Then our assurance objective is to reduce this
uncertainty to an acceptable level. This is different, but complementary, to the
system safety objective of reducing risk to an acceptable level.
Uncertainty is an established measure of performance when perceiving the
world. A desired property of perception is accuracy, that is, the estimated state
being close to the true state of the world. In engineering measurement practice,
the concept of accuracy has been largely abandoned and replaced by uncertainty
estimation, however. For example, the “Guide to the expression of uncertainty in
measurement” (GUM) [4] considers accuracy as a qualitative concept since the
true value of the measured physical quantity is generally unknown and unknow-
able. On the other hand, measurement uncertainty, defined as a characterization
of the dispersion of the values that could reasonably be attributed to the quan-
tity being measured [4], can be estimated based on observable quantities and
available knowledge. Note that measurement errors due to systematic effects
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(i.e., measurement bias) can be reduced if the effect is identified and a correc-
tion is applied. However, uncertainty will remain about whether the correction
adequate. The GUM requires that sources of uncertainty associated with both
random and systematic effects in the measurement procedure, instruments, and
the particular measurement are rigorously identified and assessed.
In this position paper, we propose that this recommendation should apply to
all perception tasks, not just the measurement of physical quantities. Perception
can be seen as a form of measurement of state and has an associated perceptual
uncertainty. For example, classifier accuracy on a test set is one observable quan-
tity that can be used to estimate the overall uncertainty of a classifier in the field,
but additional influence factors, such as the test set quality and representative-
ness, must also be considered. When a perceptual component is safety-critical,
identifying the factors that influence perceptual uncertainty is a key step in
assuring safety.
Our aim in this paper is to outline a generic framework for managing percep-
tual uncertainty in order to support the systematic safety assurance of perception
components. Specifically, our contributions are the following: (1) we present a
generic model for thinking about perception components called the perception
triangle; (2) we discuss how perceptual uncertainty can be seen as a performance
measure used to define safety requirements; and, (3) we identify as set of fac-
tors that influence perceptual uncertainty and discuss their measurement and
impacts.
2 Perception and Uncertainty
An ADS relies on perception to discover the current state of the subject vehicle
and its driving environment and track the state over time. Figure 1a illustrates
the perception task using a perception triangle, which is loosely inspired by the
semiotic triangle.
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Fig. 1: Perception triangle
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The objective of perception is to create a conceptual representation of the real
world that captures facts relevant to the task. A concept defines the structure
of the representation, including relevant attributes and relations. For example,
a pedestrian is a person within a road who is neither a vehicle occupant nor
a rider. Pedestrian attributes relevant to driving include pedestrian pose and
extent, dynamic state, and activity. A mapping from the concept to real-world
situations and scenarios identifies concept instances in the situations and sce-
narios, and thereby defines the concept semantics. Perception, indicated by the
bent arrow, achieves the inverse task of linking real-world situations to their con-
ceptual representation in two steps. First the sensory channel produces sensory
data, such as images and radar returns. Then perception algorithms interpret
the data to create the conceptual representation of the real world. The sensory
channel represents the information pathway from the objects in the real-world
scene to one or more sensors. Figure 1a represents perception at the domain level,
which includes all conceivable situations and scenarios to define the concept of
interest. The next section gives an example of an instance-level realization of the
triangle for perceiving a particular real-world situation or scenario.
2.1 Perceptual Uncertainty as a Performance Measure
Perception yields an uncertain, or limited knowledge of the true state of the
world, which is called perceptual uncertainty. Figure 1b illustrates this idea by
instantiating the perception triangle for the pedestrian concept and a particular
real-world situation. The situation contains a pedestrian who is visible to the
camera and radar sensors of the subject vehicle. The true state of the pedestrian
may be “standing still”, but the perception algorithm interprets the sensory
data and comes up with its own hypotheses about the state (see the ellipse in
Figure 1b). Probability mass or density function over the possible world states
can model this uncertainty, where probability represents the credibility of any
of the states being the true state given the knowledge of the overall perception
setup. The perception algorithm may compute either an estimate of this proba-
bility distribution over the states or a point estimate of the state. In the latter
case, one may use existing knowledge about the perception system, such as test
results, to reason about the uncertainty of the point estimate.
The goal of ADS perception is to establish facts about the real world with
acceptable perceptual uncertainty and sufficient timeliness as required for the
dynamic driving task. The required perception performance depends on the type
of fact to be established, the driving situation, and the overall ADS performance
to be achieved. For example, perception of minor roughness is not safety relevant,
but may be required for driving comfort; however, perception of major pavement
damage, such as big potholes, is safety relevant.
ADS safety is the absence of unreasonable risk of crashes due to inadequate
behavior, malfunctions, or security vulnerabilities. Existing practices and stan-
dards address safety assurance related to software and hardware malfunctions [5]
and security vulnerabilities [9]. Our focus is on unreasonable risk caused by in-
adequate perception performance. The safety requirements on perception are
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established through hazard analysis and risk assessment, which considers dif-
ferent situations and scenarios that the system can encounter in operation, as
defined by its Operational Design Domain (ODD) [8]. The resulting safety re-
quirements specify what types of facts need to be perceived and the bounds on
the uncertainty in different driving situations in order to keep the crash risk
reasonable. Thus the safety requirements analysis must consider the crash risk
caused by an incorrect perceptual decision and the reasonableness of this risk.
Figure 1a illustrates the key elements of safety requirements on perception.
The concept specification should list the states to be perceived. For pedestrian
detection, they may include pedestrian pose and extent, dynamic state, and
activity; however, the specification should also provide additional concept fea-
tures that may impact pedestrian perception in the context of the ODD, such as
different illumination and occlusion levels, clothing variations, pedestrian traf-
fic density, and situation context. The performance specification on perception
(bent arrow) should provide scenario-dependent detection range and bounds on
detection uncertainty and timing.
2.2 Factors Influencing Perceptual Uncertainty When Using
Machine Learning
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Fig. 2: Sources of perceptual uncertainty when using machine learning.
In order to meet the specification, the sources of perceptual uncertainty
must be identified and controlled. Figure 2 implements the specification-level
perceptual triangle from Figure 1a using supervised ML. The figure shows two
implementation-level perceptual triangles—one for development and another for
operation (we assume no learning in operation). The left triangle illustrates
training and testing during development. A necessarily partial set of situations
and scenarios exemplifies the concept semantics for training and testing during
development. The recorded sensory data is typically passed to human labelers,
who interpret and label it. The training and testing process (shown as the fat
arrow) uses the resulting labeled data to produce a trained model. The right
triangle illustrates inference during operation. The trained model interprets the
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sensory data from the situations and scenarios in operation and produces the
estimated state. The dashed arrow summarizes the overall perception as the
composition of sensing and inference.
Figure 2 identifies the factors that influence the overall perceptual perfor-
mance in operation. Their influence and interdependence are as follows.
Conceptual uncertainty (F1): The concept definition may allow different in-
terpretations by different stakeholders. Conceptual uncertainty influences the
selection of development situations and scenarios (F2) by making developers
uncertain whether a particular situation or scenario is relevant to exemplify the
concept. It also increases labeling uncertainty (F5) by increasing the chances that
different labelers will interpret the concept differently. Conceptual uncertainty
can be assessed qualitatively, such as by an expert review, or quantitatively,
such as through labeling disagreement statistics and additional labeler feedback.
The latter requires an enhanced labeling effort that also includes the additional
concept and scenario features relevant to F2 and F3.
Development situation and scenario coverage (F2): This factor is the degree
to which the situations and scenarios used in training and testing cover the
specified concept and ODD. It impacts model uncertainty (F6) and, through it,
the perceptual uncertainty, which will be reduced if instances of situations and
scenarios in specification scope are missed or are too few. Enhanced labeling of
training and test datasets with additional concept and scenario features allows
computing coverage and frequency statistics to guide the subsequent improve-
ment of these sets; however, extensive validation testing and data collection in
the field are necessary to discover so-called unknown unknowns, i.e., new relevant
situations and scenarios that cannot be constructed from knowledge collected so
far [6].
Situation or scenario uncertainty (F3): The structure of a situation or sce-
nario may limit the observability of the state of interest and thereby allow mul-
tiple interpretations. As a result, the perceptual uncertainty will increase. This
factor can be assessed through measures such as distance, levels of occlusion,
illumination, and clutter, which were already mentioned under F1 and F2. For
example, pedestrian distance and occlusions will limit the amount of informa-
tion about the pedestrian that reaches the vehicle sensors. The impact of these
measures on perceptual uncertainty should be assessed in testing.
Sensor properties (F4): Sensor properties, in combination with the situation
and scenario, may limit the amount of information of interest that is sensed, and
thereby increase the perceptual uncertainty. Important sensor properties include
sensing mode, range, resolution, noise characteristics, calibration, and placement.
The sensor requirements are determined from perception requirements using
established methods from sensor engineering [1].The impact of sensor properties
on the overall perception result, especially given a trained model, should be
assessed through sensitivity studies.
Labeling uncertainty (F5): Human labelers may disagree due to limited knowl-
edge of the concept (F1) or the uncertainty from F3-4 or simply make accidental
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mistakes when labeling. Established methods exist to measure and reduce this
uncertainty [3].
Model uncertainty (F6): There is an uncertainty of what the model has
learned in training and what decisions it will make in operation. This uncertainty
depends on model class, capacity, and training data and procedure. Confidence
measures (e.g., Bayesian deep learning [2]) can be used to provide a run-time
measure of model uncertainty. For example, a low confidence pedestrian detec-
tion indicates a potential weakness in the model which must be diagnosed and
addressed (e.g., by adding training data, changing the model class, etc.)
Operational domain uncertainty (F7): There is also uncertainty whether the
situations and scenarios encountered in operation were adequately reflected in
training; and whether the sensor properties in operation match those in training.
For example, sensors in operation may be misaligned or calibrated differently.
Novelty detection methods have been proposed to detect out-of-distribution in-
puts (i.e., outliers). For example, the training dataset can be used without la-
bels to train an autoencoder to identify the characteristics of the dataset. At
run-time, new inputs are checked for their similarity to the dataset (i.e., their
novelty) by checking how well the autoencoder can reconstruct them [7]. The
frequency of novel inputs encountered at run-time is a measure of operational
domain uncertainty (F7).
3 Conclusion and Next Steps
In this position paper, we present first steps toward the development of a generic
framework for perception safety that focuses on reducing perceptual uncertainty
to an acceptable level. We identified a set of factors that contribute to percep-
tual uncertainty and briefly discussed their measurement and impact. Several
topics are logical next steps. First, the measurement of the factors and their
effects on perceptual uncertainty requires a systematic analysis; in addition to
measurement at development time, F3,4,6,7 should also be assessed in opera-
tion. Next, methods to control, that is, eliminate or reduce, the negative effects
of these factors on perceptual uncertainty, and if not possible, to mitigate the
effects, need to be provided. Finally, the argument structures and types of evi-
dence to support claims about perceptual uncertainty in safety cases need to be
established.
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